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More than two decades and two hundred thousand dollars in legal fees
ago, fifty White Mountain Apaches began work hauling trees to a saw-
mill on the Fort Apache Reservation in Arizona.' In 1971 the state high-
way department demanded that Pinetop Logging, the Apaches' employer,
pay back taxes for its highway and fuel use.2 As a "contract motor carrier
of property," the company conceded that it should have been liable.
On behalf of Pinetop and its Native American employees, however, the
Tribe filed suit in state court. It alleged that the Arizona taxes were pre-
empted by federal regulations, thus violating the supremacy clause of the
Constitution.' The United States Supreme Court ultimately agreed with
the Tribe and declared the taxes invalid.' The Apaches then used that
judgment to revive a federal suit5 for declaratory and injunctive relief and
attorney's fees under section 1983,6 charging that Arizona had deprived
them of their constitutional rights under the supremacy clause.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the Tribe's suit. The
supremacy clause, the court decided, secures no constitutional rights.' And
1. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Williams, 810 F.2d 844 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1060 (1987); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 138-41 (1980). On the
Tribe's problems and prospects, see also Apaches Striving for Self-Sufficiency, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9,
1985, at A14, col. 3.
2. The tax provision may be found in ARiz. REv. STAT. AN. §§ 28-1552, 40641(A)(1) (Supp.
1979).
3. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 120 Ariz. 282, 585 P.2d 891 (Ct. App. 1978),
rev'd, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
The supremacy clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
4. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
5. See Williams, 810 F.2d at 846-47 (detailing procedural history).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 reads in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, [or] regulation . . . of any State
.... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any. . . person. . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Section 1988, id. § 1988, gives courts discretion to award attorney's fees to winning section 1983
plaintiffs.
7. Williams, 810 F.2d at 848; see also Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, 730 F.2d 1139,
1143-44 (8th Cir.) (similar analysis for section 1983 dormant commerce clause action), cert. denied,
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even if it does, the court continued, section 1983 does not embrace "struc-
tural" provisions of the Constitution." The Apaches had no cause of
action.
This Note challenges the Ninth Circuit's ruling9 and argues that sec-
tion 1983 does provide a remedy to persons'0 deprived of their rights"
under the supremacy clause. 2 The Note asks two questions: First, what is
a "right . ..secured by the Constitution"? Second, given a definition,
does the supremacy clause secure any section 1983 constitutional rights?'"
In answering those questions, this Note concludes that the Tribe should
have won. Yet the Apaches' unusual coupling of section 1983 and the
supremacy clause also points to the Note's broader theme. By denying the
469 U.S. 834 (1984).
8. Williams, 810 F.2d at 848-50; see also Kassel, 730 F.2d at 1143-44.
9. Cases in which courts agreed with the Ninth Circuit include Gould, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of
Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 750 F.2d 608 (7th Cir. 1984); Pirolo v. City of Clearwater, 711
F.2d 1006 (11th Cir. 1983); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wis-
consin, 663 F. Supp. 682 (W.D. Wis. 1987); New York Airlines v. Dukes County, 623 F. Supp. 1435
(D. Mass. 1985); Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 617 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Wash. 1985); United
Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, 564 F. Supp. 581 (D.R.I. 1983). But see ANR Pipeline Co. v. Michigan
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 608 F. Supp. 43 (W.D. Mich. 1984); see also City Investing Co. v. Simcox, 633
F.2d 56, 57, 64 n.18 (7th Cir. 1980).
10. Section 1983 (and constitutional) "persons" include corporations. See, e.g., Fulton Mkt. Cold
Storage Co. v. Cullerton, 582 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1121 (1979); see also
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). But cf. Hague v. Committee for
Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 514 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.) (corporations not entitled to constitu-
tional protections afforded "citizens").
11. This Note will use the word "right" as defined below, see infra text accompanying notes
83-87, and the word "interest" to mean any claim or desire that may or may not be a "right,"
"privilege," or "immunity." See 4 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 56-57 (1959).
12. But see Collins, "Economic Rights," Implied Constitutional Actions, and the Scope of Section
1983, 77 GEo. L.J. (forthcoming 1989) (arguing that section 1983 should not be available to
supremacy clause plaintiffs, nor, more generally, to plaintiffs suing for violations of so-called "eco-
nomic rights"). -
13. In cases of statutory interpretation, courts should construe a statute's words before deciding
whether that statute covers a particular claim. See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 14 (1921); see also, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980). Sometimes
courts construct their own, unstated definition of particular terms, decide whether a plaintiff's claim
fits their definition, and then declare that the claim falls outside the statute. This pretextual approach
,may lead to results consistent with this Note's analysis. E.g., ANR Pipeline Co. v. Michigan Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 608 F. Supp. 43 (W.D. Mich. 1984) (upholding section 1983 action for supremacy
clause violation); cf Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980) (upholding section 1983
action for dormant commerce clause violation); Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
However, it would also lead courts to reinterpret the word "rights" each time a section 1983 plaintiff
invokes a different constitutional clause. After exploring section 1983's broad purposes, this Note
offers a more principled framework for applying section 1983-one which holds for other contexts as
well, including, most significantly, the dormant commerce clause. Cf Private Truck Council of Am. v.
Secretary of State, 503 A.2d 214 (Me.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1129 (1986) (denying section 1983
action for dormant commerce clause violation); J & J Anderson, Inc. v. Town of Erie, 767 F.2d 1469
(10th Cir. 1985); Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, 730 F.2d 1139 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 834 (1984); Collins, supra note 12 ("most claims under the dormant commerce clause
should probably not be actionable under section 1983"); cf also cases cited supra note 9 (relying on
dormant commerce clause cases to dismiss section 1983 supremacy clause actions); Case Note, 7 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 757 (1984) (using pretextual method to argue for section 1983 actions for
dormant commerce clause violations); Note, Dormant Commerce Clause Claims Under 42 U.S.C. §
1983: Protecting the Right To Be Free of Protectionist State Action, 84 MICH. L. REv. 157 (1987)
(same).
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Apaches their fees, this Note argues, the Ninth Circuit ignored section
1983's role in "the commitment of society to be governed by law." 4 Sec-
tion I examines section 1983's language and history and concludes that
the statute is best understood as a tool for "transformative constitutional-
ism." Section II proposes a definition of the statute's terms that fits its
purpose. Section III demonstrates that supremacy clause claims fall within
the definition and discusses this Note's ramifications.
I. SECTION 1983: INTERPRETING THE STATUTE'S LANGUAGE
A court considering a supremacy clause claim under section 1983
should turn first to the statute's language.' 5 Section 1983 provides a pri-
vate cause of action to those deprived of "any rights, privileges, or immu-
nities secured by the Constitution and laws."' 6 The words "rights," "priv-
ileges," and "immunities" appear in innumerable statutes, including the
Reconstruction era civil rights laws.' 7 In spite of-or because of-their
common use, none of the words has a "plain meaning."'" Section 1983's
ambit thus depends on a definition of its terms that comports with the
statute's origins, purposes, and historical development.' 9
14. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the Statute Re-
main Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 28 (1985).
15. See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527,
535-36 (1947); see also supra note 13. For an irreverent look at the canons of statutory construction,
see K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 521-35 (1960).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
17. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1982); id. § 242; 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982).
18. Despite a constant barrage of criticism, see, e.g., Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the
Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800 (1983), and the Supreme Court's less-
than-confident application of it, see, e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 569-74
(1982), the "plain meaning rule" is still accepted doctrine. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. Patter-
son, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) ("As in all cases involving statutory construction, 'our starting point must
be the language employed by Congress,' and we assume 'that the legislative purpose is expressed by
the ordinary meaning of the words used' ") (citations omitted). Yet while "analytical jurists" in the
academy have tried to narrow each word's meaning, see, e.g., W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
CONCEFrIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING (1923), the Supreme Court has used the words
"rights," "privileges," and "immunities" with far less precision. Compare, e.g., Morgan v. Louisiana,
93 U.S. 217 (1876) ("franchise" includes "rights" and "privileges," but not "immunities") with, e.g.,
The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 89 (1873) (Constitution's "privileges and immu-
nities" protects, among others, "right" to petition the federal government). While "right" may have a
"normal and customary meaning" in the Internal Revenue Code, United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S.
125, 136 (1972), in general "Itihere is no more ambiguous word in legal and juristic literature." 4 R.
POUND, supra note 11, at 56; see also J.C. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 7-8
(1921); cf. Nichol, Federalism, State Courts, and Section 1983, 73 VA. L. REV. 959, 988-89 (1987)
(section 1983's "unambiguous[]" language "provides an insurmountable barrier" to its being limited).
19. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 313-54 (1986) (courts' statutory interpretations
should "fit" legislative intent and subsequent judicial development in manner which shows "legislative
process" in "best light"); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to the Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HARV. L. REV. 630, 664 (1958) (questioning whether courts can "interpret a word in a statute
without knowing the aim of the statute"); see also Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S.
96, 103 (1963) ("purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone"); cf. A. Hart & H. Sacks, The
Legal Process 1410 (tent. ed. 1958) ("The function of a court in interpreting a statute is to decide
what meaning ought to be given to the directions of the statute in the respects relevant to the case
before it.").
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A. The Original Definition of Section 1983 Constitutional Rights
A definition of section 1983's terms should be grounded in the words of
the Congress that debated and ultimately passed the statute.20 Yet even
though they thoroughly vented their views over section 1983's constitu-
tionality, the members of the Forty-second Congress hardly discussed the
statute's substantive reach. "1
The few Congressmen who mentioned its scope put forth conflicting
opinions. Senator Edmunds, for example, thought section 1983 uncon-
troversial because it tracked the Civil Rights Act of 1866,22 which
criminalized interference with specific, delineated interests, such as "the
right to make and enforce contracts."2 In contrast, Representative Shel-
labarger, who sponsored section 1983, reassured its opponents that the bill
protected only the "privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
States"2 which Justice Washington had listed in Corfield v. Coryell.25
Only two Congressmen tried to offer more precise definitions. Repre-
sentatives Kerr" and Burchard 7 agreed that "privileges and immunities"
referred to specific interests, but Kerr insisted that "[i]t is most erroneous
to suppose that the words 'rights,' 'privileges,' and 'immunities' are syno-
nomous. They are not."' 28 Despite the latter words' restricted meaning,
20. On the dangers of determining the collective "intent" of a legislature, see United States v.
Public Util. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 319-21 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
21. Congressman Dawes expressed his concern: "The rights, privileges, and immunities of the
American citizen, secured to him under the Constitution of the United States, are the subject-matter of
this bill. They are not defined in it, and there is no attempt in it to put limitation upon any of them;
but whatever they are, however broad or important, however minute or small, . . . they are in this
law." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1871) (Rep. Dawes); see also id. app. at 216-17 (Sen.
Thurman) (similar); id. at 485 (Rep. Cook) (similar).
22. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 568 (1871) (Sen. Edmunds); see also id. app. at 68 (Rep.
Shellabarger); Collins, supra note 12.
23. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. The current version of the 1866 Act, codified at 18
U.S.C. § 242 (1982), now protects "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States." Sections 242 and 1983 are considered in pari materia.
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 797 (1966); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 185 (1961). But cf.
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 643-44 & n.29 (1979) (Powell, J., concur-
ring) (doubting that sections 1983 and 242 have same scope). Since the two statutes are now worded
almost identically, the Price construction makes sense. However, the statutes' different terms in 1871
suggest that had it originally tracked section 242, section 1983 would have been drastically limited.
See id. at 617 n.34.
24. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st. Sess. app. 69 (1871) (Rep. Shellabarger); see also id. at 334
(Rep. Morgan); id. at 500-01 (Sen. Frelinghuysen); id. at 660 (Rep. Vickers); id. app. at 91 (Rep.
Duke); id. app. at 117 (Sen. Blair); id. app. at 228 (Sen. Boreman). Representative Shellabarger's
role as sponsor may account for his contradictory statements. Compare id. app. at 68 with id. app. at
69 (declaring both that section 1983 tracks, and goes beyond, section 241).
25. 6 F. Cas. 546, 4 Wash. C.C. 371 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). Justice Washington
included on his list "the right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or reside in any other state
: ..; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind
in the courts of the state; [and] to take, hold and dispose of property." Id. at 551-52, 4 Wash C.C. at
380.
26. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 47 (1871) (Rep. Kerr).
27. See id. app. at 313 (Rep. Burchard).
28. Id. app. at 47. Representative Kerr strongly opposed the bill, and in the instant speech he
tried to show that Congress could have no power under the Fourteenth Amendment's "privileges and
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"[t]he word 'rights' is generic, embracing all that may be lawfully
claimed."29
Section 1983's legislative history thus suggests that the Forty-second
Congress collectively considered "privileges" and "immunities" terms of
legal art. "Rights," in contrast, meant something different.30 While ulti-
mately inconclusive, 3 Kerr's and Burchard's definitions are useful begin-
nings. Section 1983's historical context helps give them shape.
B. The Purposes of Section 1983
By 1871 the fallout from the Civil War had spawned a "condition of
affairs. . . rendering life and property insecure and the carrying of mails
and the collection of the revenue dangerous. ' 32 The Forty-second Con-
gress responded by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
Section 1983's legislative history reveals that Congress forged the stat-
ute's remedial features 4 in direct response to the Ku Klux Klan's crimes 5
immunities" clause to protect, more broadly, people's "rights." See id. app. at 49-50 ("The word
'rights' does not occur [in the Fourteenth Amendment]. Why insert it in the bill?"); see also id. app.
at 88 (Rep. Storm) (word "'rights' craftily superadded to the terms 'privileges and immunities' "); id.
app. at 91 (Rep. Duke) ("Was there not an object in interpolating the words 'any rights'?").
29. Id. app. at 47; see also id. app. at 313 (Rep. Burchard) (quoting Citizenship, 10 Op. Att'y
Gen. 382, 407 (1862)); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866) (Rep. Wilson) (quoting
same in debate over section 242). A contemporary reference book, 2 BouviER's LAW DICTIONARY
484 (12th ed. 1868), and a contemporary state court, Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 287, 306-07
(1871), defined "right" similarly.
30. See Collins, supra note 12, at n.214 ("the so-called plain meaning of 'rights, privileges, or
immunities' in the statute would seem to be more directly tied to the similarly phrased but long-
neglected privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment ... , [but of] course, the
inclusion of the word 'rights' (in addition to 'privileges or immunities') arguably makes § 1983
broader than that particular constitutional provision"); see also Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147,
152 (1882) (courts must "give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it
may be, any construction which implies that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the lan-
guage it employed").
31. Cf Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 474 (1921) ("the views and motives
of individual members [of Congress] are not a safe guide, and hence may not be resorted to, in ascer-
taining the meaning and purpose of the law-making body"); Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
9, 24 (1845).
32. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 244 (1871) (President Grant's message "recommend[ing]
such legislation as in the judgement of Congress shall effectually secure life, liberty, and property, and
the enforcement of law in all parts of the United States").
33. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. Section 1 of the act is now section 1983. The
Supreme Court struck down the part of section 2 criminalizing private conspiracies to interfere with
constitutional rights in United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882); it upheld the part of section 2
providing civil remedies against conspiracies, now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982), in Griffin
v. Breckinridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
34. First, and most fundamentally, plaintiffs might use the statute to overturn state laws that
threaten constitutional rights. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173 (1961). Second, section 1983
offers victims a federal remedy when state remedies are inadequate or non-existent. See id. at 173-74.
Finally, section 1983 supplements adequate state remedies that may not be available in practice. See
id. at 174-75. The Monroe Court downplayed the first advantage because the majority meant to
emphasize that an official need not necessarily obey a statute to be acting "under color of law." See id.
at 173-74. Justice Frankfurter argued that Congress mainly, if not exclusively, sought to deter the
enactment of unconstitutional laws. See id. at 202 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
35. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 441-51, 605-07 (1871) (reporting Klan's out-
rages); id. app. at 29-40, 190-201, 283-98 (same); S. RE,. No. 1, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. (1871)
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and to Southern officialdom's condonation of disorder."6 Implicit in section
1983's legislative history is Congress's more general goal. The Recon-
struction amendments3 7 and civil rights statutes 8 were Congress's legal
means of consolidating the changes wrought by the Union's victory. 9 The
Civil War had been fought over more than just racial equality-it had
been a war over the soul of the Constitution.40 Section 1983 was meant to
further the winners' constitutional vision.
The Reconstruction Congresses "insist[ed] that We the People were
emphatically more than a confederation of states,"41 but the specific com-
ponents of that broad vision were often discordant. During the debates
over the Civil Rights Act, Congressmen differed over who could seek a
remedy under the bill.42 They worried about the constitutional sources of
Congress's power to pass the bill;43 about the constitutionality of criminal-
izing private conspiracies; 44 and about the constitutionality of empowering
the President to suppress insurrection 45 and suspend the writ of habeas
(same).
36. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 394 (1871) (Rep. Rainey); id. app. at 190-94 (Rep.
Buckley); id. app. at 213-14 (Sen. Johnston); see also Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and
Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1154 (1977) [hereinafter Developments].
37. U.S. CONsT. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
38. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (outlawing "Black Codes"); Act of May 31, 1870, ch.
14, 16 Stat. 140 (protecting voting rights); Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (same); Act of
Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (described supra note 33); Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat.
335 (outlawing racial discrimination in public accomodations).
39. See Blackmun, supra note 14, at 3-6; Developments, supra note 36, at 1143-47.
40. See H. BELZ, EMANCIPATION AND EQUAL RIGHTS 1 (1978) ("The Civil War was a constitu-
tional crisis of the most profound sort. . . . [T]he purpose of the war in the most fundamental sense
became the determination of how American government would be constituted."); P. PALUDAN, A
COVENANT WITH DEATH 27 (1975) ("When war broke out, . . . more than a question of armed
might was at issue-the foundation of law itself had been challenged. . . . [Tihe fight was for the
Constitution itself."); id. at 27-60 (describing conflicting interpretations of Constitution motivating
North and South); H. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION 124-40 (1973) (describing evolution of
constitutionalist discourse under effects of war); President Lincoln's Message to Congress in Special
Session (July 4, 1861), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 393-96 (H. Commager
8th ed. 1968); see also Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J.
1013, 1065-69 (1984) (discussing "Article V difficulties" of Civil War Amendments and concluding
that "the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. . .were exercising the full powers of a 'Constitu-
tional Convention' in the way they proposed to make their constitutional amendment a part of our
higher law"). For a recent exploration of similar themes, see also W. SAFIRE, FREEDOM (1987).
41. Ackerman, supra note 40, at 1068; see H. BELz, supra note 40, at 142 ("in political and
constitutional development the war produced significant nationalizing changes"). But cf H. HYMAN,
supra note 40, at 307-46 (discussing concurrent strengthening of states' powers); Developments,
supra note 36, at 1142 ("overall shift in the balance of power between the federal and state govern-
ments . . . was moderate").
42. While some Congressman hoped that the bill would help blacks achieve civil equality, see,
e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 340-41 (1871) (Rep. Kelley); id. at 505-06 (Sen. Pratt),
others stressed that the law would not simply "protect Republicans only in their property, liberties,
and lives, but Democrats as well, not the colored only, but the whites also; yes, even women and
children, all races and all classes, will be benefitted alike." Id. app. at 190 (Rep. Buckley); see also id.
app. at 265 (Rep. Barry); id. at 569-70 (Sen. Ames).
43. See, e.g., id. app. at 46-50 (Rep. Kerr); id. app. at 157-60 (Rep. Golladay); id. app. at
240-47 (Sen. Bayard).
44. See, e.g., id. at 337 (Rep. Whitthorne); id. app. at 304 (Rep. Slater).
45. See, e.g., id. app. at 154-55 (Rep. Garfield); id. app. at 220-21 (Sen. Thurman).
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corpus." ' Common to all the rhetoric, however, were each Congressman's
professions of faith in the Constitution.47 Different Congressmen might
have understood the Constitution differently, 4' but all were animated by
their concern for the Constitution's integrity.
49
The Civil War, in short, "settled the question of whether the Ameri-
cans as a national people had an authentic national government, 5 ° and
reestablished the supremacy of the Constitution over military might.51
Left unsettled were the contents of specific constitutional provisions. Con-
stitutional history since Reconstruction can thus be understood as the con-
tinuing battle between different visions of different constitutional clauses
in a legal, not martial, setting. By providing citizens a sword,52 section
1983-the creation of a Congress itself engaged in the struggle over con-
stitutional meaning-became the vehicle for what Justice John Harlan
described as the faith in litigation as "the great moral substitute for force
in controversies between the people, the states, and the Union, ' 53 or what
this Note calls "transformative constitutionalism."'" The statute's develop-
ment bears that out.
46. See, e.g., id. at 352 (Rep. Beck); id. app. at 245 (Sen. Bayard).
47. See, e.g., id. app. at 86 (Rep. Bingham); id. app. at 158 (Rep. Golladay); see also P.
PALUDAN, supra note 40, at 44-47. On Constitution worship and its origins, see Corwin, The
"Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law (pts. 1 & 2), 42 HARV. L. REv. 149,
365 (1928-1929).
48. Compare, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 206-08 (1871) (Rep. Blair) (describ-
ing Constitution as limited charter checked by states' rights) with, e.g., id. at 332 (Rep. Hoar) (view-
ing Constitution as affirmative, welfare-maximizing).
49. Representative Merriam's fervor was typical: "[I]f any man doubts, I would say to the terror-
stricken,. . . 'Come! come! come!' and I would wrap them in the folds of our starry flag, and in the
presence of God and my country I would say 'Here is our Constitution, as it was, as it is, as it shall
ever be.'" Id. app. at 283 (Rep. Merriam); see also id. at 339 (Rep. Kelley); id. at 490 (Rep.
Butler); id. app. at 149 (Rep. Garfield). But see J. RANDALL & D. DONALD, THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION 633-37 (2d ed. 1969) (criticizing Reconstruction Congresses' "disregard for the
Constitution").
50. H. BELZ, supra note 40, at 142.
51. Cf S. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTrrUTION MEANS 59-61 (1984) ("continuing reaffir-
mation" of Constitution's supremacy "essential to a constitutional state of affairs").
52. See Blackmun, supra note 14, at 3-7.
53. H. HYMAN, supra note 40, at 261.
54. By "transformative constitutionalism" this Note means to imply a concept that rests between
Professor Cover's "redemptive constitutionalism," see Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-
Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983), and Professor Chayes's less mystical
"public law litigation," see Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281 (1976). Cf also Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of Parables, 93 YALE L.J.
455 (1983) (courts, like Jesus's disciples, serve as mediators and teachers in divisive disputes). Profes-
sor Cover describes "redemptive constitutionalism" as a "transformational politics that cannot be con-
tained within the autonomous insularity" of the group asserting it, and writes that "[r]edemption
takes place within an eschatological schema that postulates: (1) the unredeemed character of reality as
we know it, (2) the fundamentally different reality that should take its place, and (3) the replacement
of the one with the other." Cover, supra, at 33-35. Professor Chayes explains that "public law litiga-
tion" focuses primarily on "vindication of constitutional or statutory policies." Chayes, supra, at
1284.
Transformative constitutionalism is best exemplified by the story of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954), told in R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975). In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896), the Supreme Court decided that the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit states from
segregating passengers on railroad cars. For sixty years blacks fought a legal war to vindicate their
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C. Section 1983: Subsequent Judicial Development
For many years the Supreme Court read section 1983 narrowly.55
Eventually, however, the Court gave full effect to the statute's unqualified
words. By gradually including different claims within the statute's
bounds,5" the Supreme Court slowly revivified section 1983's part in the
process of transformative constitutionalism.
5
7
Early on, for example, the Court decided in United States v. Cruik-
shank5" that section 1983's criminal analogue-which, like section 1983
itself, reached violations of rights "secured by the Constitution"-only
covered rights which the Constitution created, and not extra-constitutional
rights which the Constitution merely protected.59 The Cruikshank Court
also restricted section 241's reach to those rights arising from the relation-
ship between an individual and the federal government .6  Lower courts
limited section 1983 accordingly. 61 In Holt v. Indiana Manufacturing
Co., 2 the Court held that section 1983 only protected "civil rights.
6 3
Later, in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,6 ' Justice
contrary constitutional vision. In Brown, they succeeded-and they used section 1983.
55. See Collins, supra note 12 ("External pressures and the politics of compromise" meant that
while "race-centered view of section 1983 may not have been the view of its framers, . . . it quickly
became the dominant one"); Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical
Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 487-515 (1982) (identifying and contrasting courts' "historical"
approach, which saw section 1983 as direct response to Klan, and later "functional" approach, which
viewed section 1983 more broadly).
56. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), the Supreme Court held that a state official acts
"under color of law" even when defying, rather than obeying, a state statute. Section 1983 actions
have increased exponentially since.
57. See B. CARDOZO, supra note 13, at 84-85 (discussing evolution of statutes' meanings); cf. G.
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (proposing that courts adopt
"common law" method of "updating" statutes).
58. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
59. See id. at 553-54; see also Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 287 (1892). See generally
Collins, supra note 12 (contrasting meaning of "secured by the Constitution" with "arising under the
Constitution").
60. The Court thus read section 241 the same way it had read the privileges or immunities clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV § 1; see The Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873) (limiting clause to those rights "which owe their existence to the
Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws"); Hague v. Committee for
Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 526 (1939) (opinion of Stone, J.) (attributing Cruikshank result to deci-
sion in Slaughter-House Cases), even though section 241 protected "rights" as well "privileges or
immunities." Cf Collins, supra note 12 (suggesting that section 1983's "openendedness simply may
have been in recognition that the privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment might
incorporate one or more of the limitations on government mentioned elsewhere in the Constitution").
61. E.g., Brawner v. Irvin, 169 F. 964 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1909).
62. 176 U.S. 68 (1900).
63. Id. at 73. What "civil rights" were was sometimes unclear, so the Court often found it easier
to say what civil rights were not. According to the Holt Court, civil rights did not include those under
the equal protection or due process clauses. Nor did civil rights include "political rights," such as the
right to vote, see Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 691 (1886); see also Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339, 367-68 (Field, J., dissenting), or "social rights," such as equal access to public facilities, see The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See generally H. HYMAN & W. WIECEx, EQUAL JUsTiCE
UNDER LAW 394-98 (1982) (discussing nineteenth century understanding of "civil," social," and
"political" rights).
64. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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Stone wrote for a plurality that section 1983's jurisdictional twin 5 only
protected rights "of personal liberty, not dependent for [their] existence
upon the infringement of property rights." '6
The Court has since repudiated each of those decisions.6 Section 1983
covers rights which the Constitution protects as much as those which the
Constitution creates,68 including, for example, First Amendment rights,69
Fifteenth Amendment rights,70 Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
rights,7 '1 and Fourteenth Amendment due process clause property rights.7 2
It also protects rights secured by federal laws-which means, the Court
has held, all laws,'7 including, for example, laws enacted pursuant to the
appropriations clause,74 the compacts clause, 5 or the interstate or Indian
commerce clauses.7 6 Section 1983 has retained its transformative vitality:
The Supreme Court has never placed a constitutional provision outside
section 1983.17
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1982). This provision was separated from section 1983 during the statu-
tory overhaul of 1874. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608-10 (1979).
66. Hague, 307 U.S. at 531 (opinion of Stone, J.). Justices Black and Roberts thought that the
union's right to assemble was one of Cruikshank's "privileges or immunities" of national citizenship.
67. See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966) (overruling Cruikshank limits on section
241); Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972) (overruling Justice Stone's Hague distinc-
tion between "personal" and "property" rights, and limiting Holt to its facts). But cf. Collins, supra
note 12 (proposing that Supreme Court resurrect and reformulate Justice Stone's Hague opinion).
68. See Hague, 307 U.S. at 526-27, quoted in Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441
U.S. 600, 613 n.29 (1979) ("The argument that the phrase in the statute 'secured by the Constitution'
refers to rights 'created,' rather than 'protected' by it, is not persuasive. The preamble of the Constitu-
tion, [for example,] . . . uses the word 'secure' in the sense of 'protect' or 'make certain.' "); see also
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 429 (1871) (Rep. Beatty).
69. See, e.g., West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (rights under free
exercise clause).
70. See, e.g., Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 485-86 (1903).
71. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown is perhaps the triumphant
pinnacle of transformative constitutionalism.
72. See, e.g., Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
Sections 241 and 242 criminalize invasions of Fourth Amendment rights, see, e.g., Irvine v. Califor-
nia, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), and Fifteenth Amendment rights, see, e.g., Anderson v. United States, 417
U.S. 211 (1974); see also, e.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (voting rights under
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2). They also protect the right to interstate travel, see, e.g., United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), which is clearly a constitutional one, though its source is a matter of
dispute. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 & n.8 (1969) (citing possiblities).
73. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) ("the phrase 'and laws,' as used in § 1983,
means what it says").
74. See, e.g., id. at 1; see also, e.g., United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76 (1884) (section 242
prosecution for interference with rights under Homestead Acts, passed under Congress's territory
clause power, U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2).
75. See Keaukaha-Panaewa Community Ass'n v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n, 739 F.2d 1467 (9th
Cir. 1984) (section 1983 action for violation of rights under Hawaiian Homes Comm'n Act, passed
under Congress's implied compacts clause power, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 3, and its admission of
new states power, id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 563 (1968) (section 241 prosecution for interfer-
ence with rights under Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1982)); Chase v. McMasters,
573 F.2d 1011, 1017 (8th Cir. 1978) (section 1983 action for violation of rights under statute passed
under Congress's Indian Commerce and treaty making powers, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; id. art.
II, § 2, cl. 2).
77. In Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 320 (1884), the Court distinguished between constitu-
tional provisions that "protect" rights and those that "create" rights, and it decided that the contracts
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II. SECTION 1983 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
A. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman
The Supreme Court has never delimited the range of constitutional
rights actionable under section 1983. In Pennhurst State School and Hos-
pital v. Halderman,78 however, the Court held that section 1983 afforded
plaintiffs no remedy for a statutory violation when that statute itself cre-
ated no section 1983 statutory rights. The Court's statutory focus in
Pennhurst aids our inquiry into section 1983's constitutional bounds.
In Pennhurst, residents of an institution for the mentally retarded sued
under section 1983 to enforce the Developmentally Disabled Assistance
and Bill of Rights Act,"9 which granted them, they argued, a federal stat-
utory right to "'minimally adequate habilitation' in the 'least restrictive
environment.' "8 The Court found otherwise. The statute's preamble
mentioned Congress's intention to "assist" states to help the retarded by
providing state agencies with federal money; but the statutory section at
issue imposed no specific requirements as conditions for the receipt of
funds. The statute's words, therefore, "express[ed] no more than a con-
gressional preference . . . , and, as such, [are] too thin a reed to support
[any] rights and obligations." ' When Congress encourages, rather than
orders, a statute creates no federal "rights" within the meaning of section
1983. Since section 1983 remedies the deprivations of "rights . . . secured
by the Constitution and laws," Pennhurst should help define section 1983
constitutional rights as well.82
B. A Proposed Definition
The definition of section 1983 constitutional rights that best fits its ori-
gins and development combines those formulations suggested by Penn-
clause fell within the former, but that section 1983 only reached the latter. As Professor Collins has
shown, the Court later repudiated Carter's reading of "secured." Collins, supra note 12. The con-
tracts clause thus has the same effect as other constitutional provisions, and plaintiffs subject to state
laws that violate it should be entitled to remedies under section 1983. See McGuire v. Sandier, 337
F.2d 902 (5th Cir. 1964) (upholding contracts clause action under section 1983); Cobb v. City of
Maiden, 202 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1953) (same).
78. 451 U.S. 1 (1980).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1982).
80. Id.; see 451 U.S. at 7.
81. 451 U.S. at 19; see also Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 413 (1970).
82. The constitutional and statutory inquiries are not identical. Most lower courts trying to apply
Pennhurst have used the Supreme Court's test from Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), for finding
implied private rights of action. See, e.g., New York Airlines, Inc. v. Dukes County, 623 F. Supp.
1435, 1444-45 (D. Mass. 1985). Under Cores first prong, a federal statute implies a cause of action
if the plaintiff claiming it shows that she is "'one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted.'" 422 U.S. at 78 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). As the Court has stressed,
however, the Constitution does not "partake of the prolixity of a legal code," McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819), and the question, therefore, "of who may enforce a statutory
right is fundamentally different from the question of who may enforce a right that is protected by the
Constitution." Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979) (emphasis in original).
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hurst and by Representatives Kerr and Burchard: 3 in order to serve sec-
tion 1983's function as vehicle for transformative constitutionalism, a sec-
tion 1983 "right" should include any "claim of duty"-any argument that
the Constitution imposes a legal obligation on a person or government
entity to act or not to act in a particular way." By its own terms section
1983 requires that the rights it protects be "secured" by the Constitution;
a section 1983 constitutional right should therefore include any claim of
duty that the Constitution creates or protects.8 5 Section 1983 provides a
cause of action for the victims of constitutional torts-it did not create any
substantive rights,86 and by the same logic, should not of its own force
destroy any. A decision that the Constitution does not guarantee certain
rights should rest on a construction of the Constitution itself.87
C. Objections to This Note's Definition
1. Section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment
Some courts88 and commentators 9 have averred that section 1983 ex-
tends as far as, but no farther than, the Fourteenth Amendment. Section
83. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
84. Cf. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
454 U.S. 464, 493 n.5 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("When the Constitution makes it clear that a
particular person is to be protected from a particular form of government action, then that person has
a 'right' to be free of that action."); Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96
YALE L.J. 1860, 1867 (1987) ("rights represent articulations-public or private, formal or infor-
mal-of claims that people use to persuade others (and themselves) about how they should be treated
and about what they should be granted"); see also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978).
85. As section 1983s drafters and the Supreme Court have recognized, the Constitution both
protects pre-existing rights and creates new ones. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 429 (1871)
(Rep. Beatty); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 613 n.29 (1979) (quoting
Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 526-27 (1939) (opinion of Stone, J.)); United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 779 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
One commentator suggests that because commerce clause plaintiffs have article III standing to sue
for commerce clause violations, they must have a constitutional "right" to engage in interstate com-
merce. The same reasoning would presumably apply to supremacy clause plaintiffs. With no extrinsic
definition of "right" supporting the major premise, however, that argument is tautological. See Note,
supra note 13, at 167-69. A plaintiff might have standing to challenge a putative right's violation but
no section 1983 constitutional right, see, e.g., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979); conversely,
she might have a right, but no standing to vindicate it in federal court, see Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 483 (1982) ("assertion
of a right to a particular kind of Government conduct, which the Government has violated by acting
differently, cannot alone satisfy the requirements of Art. III").
86. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979).
87. Cf. Collins, supra note 12.
88. See, e.g., Thompson v. New York, 487 F. Supp. 212, 220 (N.D.N.Y. 1979); Poirier v.
Hodges, 445 F. Supp. 838, 842 (M.D. Fla. 1978). The Poirier court leaned on the Supreme Court's
comment in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961), that section 1983 protected the Fourth
Amendment and other Bill of Rights provisions through the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
clause. But Poirier involved a contracts clause claim, so the court's holding was illogical: Since the
contracts clause applies directly to the states, see U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, it could never be
incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. But cf. infra note 94 (explaining
why such "incorporation" might be justifiable).
89. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 36, at 1169; cf. S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES LrrIGATION 75 (2d ed. 1986) ("relation between § 1983 and Fourteenth Amendment is
best described as very close").
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1983 was part of a statute entitled "An Act to enforce the Provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment and for other purposes,"9 and Congress
passed it under its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.91 There-
fore, they argue, section 1983 should only protect Fourteenth Amendment
rights, including, presumably, those rights secured by Bill of Rights provi-
sions incorporated in the due process clause.
92
A statute's title, however, does not affect the substantive reach of the
law.93 Moreover, although Congress enacted section 1983 under the Four-
teenth Amendment, section 1983 definitely goes beyond the amendment's
confines."' Section 1983 also protects rights secured by laws passed under
90. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 335 (1871).
91. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5; see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961). But cf. sources
cited supra note 43 (disputing origins of Congress's power); Collins, supra note 12 (in Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), Supreme Court "seemed to conclude that Congress had acted pursuant
to powers other than the Civil War amendments when it passed" section 1983) (emphasis in original).
92. Cf. Collins, supra note 12 (arguing on policy grounds that section 1983 should be limited to
victims of racial bias or violence). But see Nichol, supra note 18, at 989 (" 'Reasonably well-informed
people' could hardly conclude, from the language of the statute alone, that the evils addressed are
limited to race discrimination") (footnote omitted).
93. See Hadden v. The Collector, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 107, 110 (1867) (statute's title "cannot be
used to extend or to restrain any positive provisions contained in the body of the act"). Furthermore,
"[tlhe words 'for other purposes,' frequently added to the title in acts of Congress, are considered as
covering every possible subject of legislation." Id. at 111.
94. The Supreme Court has confirmed as much in dicta. See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405
U.S. 538, 549 n.16 (1972); see also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 667 &
n.43 (1979) (White, J., concurring); supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text (section 1983 covers,
e.g., Fifteenth Amendment rights and all statutory rights). Moreover, section 241 was also grounded
in section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, see United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755 (1966), and
the Supreme Court has suggested that its scope, too, is broader than the amendment itself. See United
States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 800 (1966) (section 241 "embraces all of the rights and privileges
secured to citizens by all of the Constitution and all of the laws of the United States") (emphasis in
original); id. at 797 (similar).
The Lynch dictum accords with Supreme Court precedent, despite Representative Shellabarger's
suggestion that the bans on state action listed in U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 10, along with, presumably,
those derived from the commerce and supremacy clauses, are only "enforceable" when a court strikes
down state laws that violate those prohibitions. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 69
(1871), quoted in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Williams, 810 F.2d 844, 848-49 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1060 (1987); cf. Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 322 (1884) (contracts clause
only secures "right to have a judicial determination, declaring the nullity of the attempt to impair [a
contract's] obligation"). In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 536, 618-22 (1842), for instance,
the Court decided that Congress could enforce the fugitive slave clause, U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, cl.
1, even though the clause contains no provision for congressional legislation. See also Puerto Rico v.
Branstad, 107 S. Ct. 2802 (1987) (Congress may enforce extradition clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, §
2); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 293 (1892) ("every right, created by, arising under or
dependent upon, the Constitution of the United States, may be protected and enforced by Congress by
such means and in such manner as Congress, in the exercise of the correlative duty of protection,...
may in its discretion deem most eligible and best adapted to attain the object"). But see Collins, supra
note 12 ("[it is highly problematic. . . whether Congress has the power to enforce naked limitations
on government in the original body of the Constitution by remedial legislation such as section 1983").
Prigg's logic leads to the conclusion that even though the supremacy clause contains no explicit
enforcement provision, Congress may still create a private cause of action for supremacy clause viola-
tions. If the Court endorses Professor Collins' powerful criticisms, two avenues remain for recognizing
non-Fourteenth Amendment claims under section 1983. First, most claims for violations of other con-
stitutional provisions could be translated into Fourteenth Amendment terms. A state bill of attainder,
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, c. 3, for example, would surely deny someone life or liberty without due
process. In fact, "such an incorporation may have been the very purpose of the derelict privileges and
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Collins, supra note 12. Second, Congress itself
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virtually all of Congress's delegated powers.95 When section 1983 covers
statutory rights grounded in a particular constitutional provision, it should
also protect constitutional rights secured by the provision itself."
2. A Hierarchy of Constitutional Rights?
Courts that apply section 1983 beyond the Fourteenth Amendment
claims still limit its reach. In a section 1983 dormant commerce clause
case, for example, the Eighth Circuit wrote that Congress meant only to
protect "important personal rights akin to fundamental rights protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment.""7 Excluded from this group are rights de-
rived from those constitutional provisions that allocate government
power.98
That a right is labeled "personal," however, signifies only that it inures
to individuals' benefits and may, therefore, be waived.99 And while certain
constitutional rights are popularly viewed as somehow more important
than others,100 as a matter of constitutional law, any ranking of rights'
relative "worth" is unsupportable.' 1 A right may have to be "fundamen-
tal" for it to come within the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
clause, 1' for example, or to trigger strict scrutiny review under the equal
might "incorporate" any rights it wants to under section five itself. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (section five "authoriz[es] Congress to exercise its discretion in determining
whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment" sub-
ject to rationality standard of McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)); see also
Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REv. 603
(1975). A more detailed exploration of these possibilities is beyond the scope of this Note.
95. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980); Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, 730
F.2d 1139, 1146 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834 (1984); see also supra notes 73-76.
96. Cf Eisenberg, supra note 55, at 511 (criticizing Thiboutot).
97. Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, 730 F.2d 1139, 1146 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 469
U.S. 834 (1984); see also, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Omaha v. Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis,
636 F.2d 195, 198 (8th Cir. 1980) (same limits on statutory rights), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042
(1981); Collins, supra note 12 (noting that such distinctions "enable[] Justices to take an 'I know it
when I see it' approach to section 1983").
98. See Kassel, 730 F.2d at 1144-45 (commerce clause); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Wil-
liams, 810 F.2d 844, 848-50 (9th Cir.) (supremacy clause), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1060 (1987); see
also J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 174-75, 201-02
(1980).
99. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848-49 (1986) (right
to article III court); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to jury trial in criminal case);
cf. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 235 n.10 (1974) ("This right is personal; it is petitioner, after all,
who must suffer the effects").
100. Popular notions of rankings of rights derive partly from the Supreme Court's Fourteenth
Amendment's jurisprudence, which distinguishes among "fundamental" and garden-variety rights, see
infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text, and partly from philosophers' normative rights theories,
which typically go no farther than generalized rights of liberty, property, equality, and the like. See,
e.g., J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE chs. 2, 3 (1971).
101. But cf. Collins, supra note 12 (proposing that Supreme Court limit section 1983 to plaintiffs
or constitutional rights deserving more rigorous Fourteenth Amendment review under United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
102. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to abortion).
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protection clause;'03 but one constitutional right-once a constitutional
right-is as important as any other.04
Furthermore, one constitutional clause may serve different functions si-
multaneously. 0 5 A provision that allocates governmental power, such as
article three,"0 ' also confers on individuals the right to an unbiased, inde-
pendent federal judiciary;1 07 and a provision that ostensibly confers rights,
like the ex post facto clause, 0 8 may also serve separation of powers prin-
ciples by forcing the legislature to act like a legislature, and not like a
judiciary.' 0 9 A constitutional provision's phrasing"0 and functions", do
not affect its status as a source of rights.
3. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization
Courts dismissing supremacy clause actions under section 1983 have
nonetheless relied on Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organiza-
tion"2 for the proposition that section 1983 does not reach supremacy
clause rights, or, more generally, rights under "structural" constitutional
provisions."' Chapman's holding, however, is far more technical" 4-and
103. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (freedom of association). But
cf. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-39 (1973) (no "fundamental" right
to free public education).
104. Cf, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982) ("[W]e know of no principled basis on which to create a hierarchy of
constitutional values"); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 9 (1957) ("[W]e can find no warrant, in logic or
otherwise, for picking and choosing among the remarkable collection of 'Thou shalt nots' which were
explicitly fastened on . . . the Federal Government by the Constitution and its Amendments"); Ull-
mann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956) (similar).
105. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 46 (1871) (Rep. Kerr).
106. U.S. CONST. art. III (establishing structural guidelines for "the judicial Power of the United
States").
107. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (article
III "serves both to 'protect the role of the independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme. .. '
and to safeguard litigants' 'right to have claims decided before judges who are free from potential
domination by other branches of government' ") (citations omitted); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 78,
at 469 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
108. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
109. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND Dxs'rsusT 90-91 (1980); see also In re Quarles, 158 U.S.
532, 534 (1895) ("The right of a citizen informing of a violation of law, . . . to be protected against
lawless violence, does not depend upon any of the amendments to the Constitution, but arises out of
the creation and establishment by the Constitution itself of a national government . . .).
110. The same is not necessarily true for federal statutes. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth.
v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1980) (if Congress intends to preclude it, section 1983
action unavailable for statutory violations); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S.
1 (1980) (statute must create rights and duties, not merely express Congress's preferences); supra note
82.
111. Cf J. CHOPER, supra note 98, at 174-75 (suggesting that extent of judicial review depend
on "primary function" of constitutional provision involved).
112. 441 U.S. 600 (1979); see, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Williams, 810 F.2d 844
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1060 (1987); Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, 730 F.2d
1139, 1143-44 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834 (1984).
113. See, e.g., Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 617 F. Supp. 735, 748 (E.D. Wash. 1985).
114. See Gould, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 750 F.2d 608, 616
n.16 (7th Cir. 1984) (acknowledging Chapman's limits), affd, 475 U.S. 282 (1986).
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congressional action since the decision has deprived it of precedential
force.
The Chapman plaintiffs brought section 1983 actions to overturn state
regulations that conflicted with the federal Social Security Act. The plain-
tiffs argued-and the Court agreed-that the supremacy clause "does 'se-
cure' federal rights by according them priority whenever they come in
conflict with state law." ' 5 Parsing the jurisdictional statute's language,
however, the Court decided that section 1343(3) could not cover rights
secured by the supremacy clause. Section 1343(3) provides federal juris-
diction for suits to vindicate rights secured by the Constitution, or by "any
Act of Congress providing for equal rights."' If section 1343(3)'s "Con-
stitution" included the supremacy clause, a claimant would always be able
to sue in federal court, even when her otherwise-statutory right was not
one providing for equal rights. Instead of ignoring the import of the spe-
cific statutory text, the Court excepted supremacy clause claims from sec-
tion 1343(3)'s scope.
17
The Chapman Court reserved the question of whether sections 1343(3)
and 1983 are coextensive. Congress's later repeal of the $10,000 thresh-
hold for general federal question jurisdiction" 8  made section
1343(3)-and Chapman-superfluous.
III. SECTION 1983 ACTIONS FOR SUPREMACY CLAUSE VIOLATIONS
A. Rights Under the Supremacy Clause
This Section argues that the supremacy clause creates a right to the
supremacy of federal law." 9 The framers' unhappy experiences under the
Articles of Confederation spurred them to forge a central government with
stronger powers.' 2" To ensure that those powers be effective,"2' the Con-
vention wrote in the supremacy clause that "This Constitution, and the
115. 441 U.S. at 613.
116. 28 U.S.C § 1343(3) (1982).
117. See 441 U.S. at 614-16. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 126 (1965), quoted in
Chapman, 441 U.S. at 614, held specifically that "cases of actual conflict with a federal statute or
treaty" were not "constitutional" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) (three judge court
required in suits to enjoin state statutes on grounds of unconstitutionality), repealed, Pub. L. No. 94-
381, §§ 1, 2, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976). Swifts reasoning might mean that cases "where state action is in
actual conflict with the explicit provisions of federal law," White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Wil-
liams, 810 F.2d 844, 850 n.8 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1060 (1987), are not "constitutional"
within the meaning of section 1983 either. If so, a plaintiff would only be able to sue under section
1983 when the federal law with which the state law conflicted itself met the test of Pennhurst State
School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (discussed supra section II-A). This Note argues
that plaintiffs' constitutional supremacy clause rights are violated whenever a state law is preempted,
even when that law does not actually violate a federal statute. While Chapman referred more ambigu-
ously to "allegation[s] of incompatibility between federal and state statutes and regulations," 441 U.S.
at 615, Swift provides little support for such a reading.
118. Pub. L. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369 (1980).
119. See supra section II-B (proposing definition of "rights").
120. See I THE FOUNDERS' CoNsTrrTmON 147-84 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987).
121. See 4 id. at 592-97; THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (J. Madison).
1988] 1841
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 97: 1827
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . ...
Although its text reads like a straightforward declaration, 22 the
supremacy clause has a self-executing effect:12 The clause deprives states
of the "power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in
any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by
Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general govern-
ment." 24 A state law is pre-empted through the supremacy clause125 if it
conflicts with a federal statute, 26 if it frustrates Congress's goals, 27 or if
it invades a field that Congress has chosen to occupy.' 28 In effect, the
unwritten supremacy clause reads like the Fourteenth Amendment: "No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall unduly interfere with
122. Some thought the supremacy clause at best a truism, and therefore unnecessary. See, e.g.,
Debates in N.C. Ratifying Convention (July 29-30, 1788), reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTI-
TUTION, supra note 120, at 602-03; 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1837
(1833). Others thought the clause might serve as a blank check for tyranny. See H. STORING, THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 110, 280-81 (abr. ed. 1985); J. MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS 124
(1961).
123. The commerce clause "has long been recognized as a self-executing limitation on the power
of the States to enact laws imposing a substantial burden on interstate commerce." South Cent. Tim-
ber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87 (1984); see also Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S.
(15 Wall.) 232 (1873). The supremacy clause operates in similar ways. See White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Williams, 810 F.2d 844, 849 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1060 (1987); Consolidated
Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, 730 F.2d 1139, 1144 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834 (1984); cf
The Banks v. The Mayor, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 16 (1868) (finding "right, privilege, or immunity" under
negative implications of affirmatively worded credit clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2).
124. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.); see also
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963). See generally Fidelity Fed. Say.
& Loan v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982) (outlining preemption analysis); Maryland v. Louisi-
ana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981). Cf. Rothschild, A Proposed "Tonic"for Florida Lime to Celebrate our
New Federalism: How to Deal with the "Headache" of Preemption, 38 U. MIAMI L. REv. 829
(1984) (criticizing Supreme Court's supremacy clause jurisprudence); Engdahl, Preemptive Capability
of Federal Power, 45 U. COLO. L. REv. 51 (1973); cf also Note, A Framework for Preemption
Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363 (1978) (offering new approach).
125. Most supremacy clause cases involve congressional exercises of its interstate commerce
power, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 3; see, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), but
Congress may preempt state laws interfering with any field in which Congress may constitutionally
act, such as immigration and naturalization, see, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941),
patents and copyrights, see, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964), or bankruptcy, see, e.g., Perez v. Campbell,
402 U.S. 637 (1971).
126. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S.
115 (1913); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Congress can explicitly preempt state
laws in a federal statute itself. See, e.g., Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, §
521(e), 90 Stat. 539, 574 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1982)); 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982) (pre-
empting state literacy tests). Conversely, Congress may explicitly save state laws from preemption.
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1321(o)(2) (1982); California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272,
295-96 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
127. See, e.g., Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 462 U.S. 406 (1983); McCarty v. McCarty, 453
U.S. 210 (1981); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); cf. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.,
481 U.S. 69 (1987).
128. See, e.g., North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300 (1983); Amalgamated Ass'n v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971); Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61 (1954); cf. Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conser-
vation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
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federal supremacy." When a state does so, a plaintiff should be able to
vindicate her supremacy clause rights using section 1983.129
B. Section 1983 Relief for Supremacy Clause Claimants
A section 1983 plaintiff is entitled, as a matter of law, to an injunction,
damages, and attorney's fees.130 Together, those remedies compensate in-
jury and deter future constitutional violations.131 Supremacy clause suits
under section 1983 will thus force governments to pause before they bur-
den the exercise of supremacy clause rights.
1. Money, Injunctions, and Sovereign Immunity
Section 1983 expressly provides that any person who successfully vindi-
cates a constitutional right can hold the defendant liable "in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." '132 A
supremacy clause plaintiff who wins a section 1983 suit should therefore
be entitled to enjoin the operation of the unconstitutional statute and to
recover damages.133
In practice, however, section 1983 injunctions will make little differ-
ence. Without section 1983, a supremacy clause plaintiff typically sues for
a declaratory judgment 3 4 that a statute is unconstitutional. 5 Injunctions
usually follow as a matter of course.13 '
Furthermore, section 1983 has no effect on the states' constitutionally
conferred sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment3 7 precludes any
recovery of money damages,138 in federal court, from the states qua
129. The Supreme Court has never referred to a supremacy clause interest as a "right." Cf e.g.,
ANR Pipeline Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 608 F. Supp. 43, 48 (W.D. Mich. 1984) ("rights
under the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause"); cf. also Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S.
493, 500 (1967) ("There are rights of constitutional stature whose exercise a State may not condition
by the exaction of a price. Engaging in interstate commerce is one.") (dictum); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824). Yet the Court's words are hardly dispositive. Whether the supremacy
clause secures a "right" depends on what the word "right" means. Cf. Case Note, supra note 13, at
761-62 (relying on Court's commerce clause language without offering definition of "rights"); Note,
supra note 13, at 165-67 (same).
130. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (1982).
131. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978). But see Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79
MICH. L. REV. 5, 47-56 (1980) (discussing failure of tort remedies to serve section 1983's deterrence
and compensatory functions).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
133. But cf Whitman, supra note 131, at 6, 70 (proposing that section 1983 be limited to suits
for injunctions).
134. See Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982).
135. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
136. See 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1982).
137. U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State").
138. Plaintiffs may sue states in federal court for injunctions. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908); see also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 288-90 (1977) (state officials acting in official
capacities amenable to suits for prospective relief).
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states1 39 or from state officials acting in their official capacities. 4 States
may, of course, waive their sovereign immunity.' Some states permit se-
lected section 1983 actions to proceed in state court,' where state judges
can award damages. It seems unlikely, though, that many states would
voluntarily expose their treasuries to potentially high damages.
On the other hand, a plaintiff subjected to local regulation might choose
to sue the city or county that injured her. Local governments enjoy no
sovereign immunity in section 1983 actions." 3 In its role in the process of
transformative constitutionalism, section 1983 redresses injured plaintiffs
in full.' A supremacy clause plaintiff should be compensated for all the
damages she suffered. Typically, her damages would include any uncon-
stitutional taxes she paid, and the city retained;" 5 any out-of-pocket costs
the plaintiff expended, which the city proximately caused; and, if she can
prove them, any profits that the plaintiff might have earned while the city
left its law in effect."
2. From Here to Attorney's Fees
With the Eleventh Amendment blocking her recovery, a supremacy
clause plaintiff suing a state might have little reason to use section 1983.
One hundred years after Reconstruction, however, Congress perfected the
139. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). But see
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1475-81 (1987) (criticizing Supreme
Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence).
140. Section 1983 plaintiffs must also contend with the doctrines of equitable restraint, see
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), Pullman abstention, see Boehning v. Indiana State Employ-
ees Ass'n, 423 U.S. 6 (1975), res judicata, see Migra City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Warren, 465
U.S. 75 (1984), and collateral estoppel, see Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). But cf. Patsy v.
Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982) (section 1983 plaintiffs need not exhaust administrative reme-
dies before suit).
141. Cf. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985) ("The test for determining
whether a State has waived its immunity from federal-court jurisdiction is a stringent one").
142. See, e.g., Private Truck Council of Am. v. Secretary of State, 503 A.2d 214 (Me.), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1129 (1986); cf. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283-85 (1980) (state courts
may, but need not, entertain section 1983 suits); Wolcher, Sovereign Immunity and the Supremacy
Clause: Damages Against States in Their Own Courts for Constitutional Violations, 69 CALiF. L.
REv. 189 (1981) (arguing that state courts must hear section 1983 claims).
143. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (overruling in part Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)).
144. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
145. Unconstitutional taxes can mount considerably before courts strike them down, and plaintiffs
denied a Fourteenth Amendment refund action, see Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 (1930), may
have to forfeit considerable sums. In Private Truck Council of Am. v. Secretary of State, 503 A.2d
214 (Me.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1129 (1986), for example, Maine withheld nearly $700,000. Tele-
phone interview with Richard D. Henderson, Executive Vice-President, Private Truck Council of
Am. (Oct. 27, 1987).
146. In J & J Anderson, Inc. v. Town of Erie, 767 F.2d 1469 (10th Cir. 1985), the district court
did not grant the Andersons a temporary restraining order until nine days after the ordinance took
effect. The Andersons estimate that they forfeited "at least a few thousand" in lost profits. Telephone
interview with Jim Anderson (Oct. 29, 1987). But cf. Collins, supra note 12 (contending that "the
incentive of damages in every case of proven injury . . . for successful constitutional plaintiffs is
arguably less needed in cases challenging broad scale social welfare or economic legislation").
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instrument it created for transformative constitutionalism. 4" Section 1988
sharpened section 1983's sword by permitting a successful plaintiff to
recoup some of her lost damages by recovering her legal expenses. 4 The
specter of high fees should not deter her from suit at the outset.349
Supremacy clause cases underscore section 1988's significance. The
White Mountain Apache Tribe, for example, paid $206,012.07 in court
costs and legal fees.15 Many might have found it cheaper to forgo suit
than to pay the lawyers they would have required. 5 Shifting attorney's
fees to losing government defendants would ensure that section 1983 not
become a "mere hollow pronouncement,"' 52 but remain, instead, an effec-
tive means for the vindication of constitutional rights.
3. Policy Objections to Section 1983 Relief
Since section 1983's coming of age,' 53 courts, as well as commentators,
have expressed concerns over section 1983's effects on federalism and on
governments' financial stability. 5 Of course, these policy arguments
should be addressed to the policy making branch of government: a court
should not emasculate section 1983 because it thinks Congress drafted an
unwise law. 55
147. See Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)) ("In any action or proceeding to enforce [section 1983] the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs.").
148. See, e.g., City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986). A winning plaintiff should ordi-
narily receive her attorney's fees so long as no special circumstances make the award unjust. Hensley
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976)).
149. See 461 U.S. at 429; S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5908, 5910 ("In many cases. . . the citizen who must sue to enforce
the law has little or no money with which to hire a lawyer. If private citizens are to be able to assert
their civil rights, and if those who violate the Nation's fundamental laws are not to proceed with
impunity, then citizens must have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate these
rights in court.").
150. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Williams, 810 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1060 (1987); see also J & J Anderson, Inc. v. Town of Erie, 767 F.2d 1469, 1471-72 (10th Cir.
1985); Anderson interview, supra note 146 ($8665.75 completely sapped year's cash flow for com-
merce clause plaintiffs). The Tribe's suit lasted almost fourteen years.
151. In retrospect, Jim Anderson said, he "regret[ted] ever bothering." Anderson interview, supra
note 146. And according to the Apaches' lawyer in Williams, most tribes have given up challenging
state taxes that might otherwise be found unconstitutional-taxes that undermine reservations' eco-
nomic bases, and threaten, in the end, Native American cultural autonomy as well. Telephone inter-
view with Neil Wake of Phoenix, Ariz. (June 29, 1988). But cf. Collins, supra note 12 ("the attor-
neys' fee incentive is not needed for most cases involving ordinary economic regulation . , [where]
there is a large pool of competent counsel ready and willing to litigate").
152. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5908, 5913.
153. See supra section I-C.
154. For judicial criticism, see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697-701 (1976); Rizzo v. Goode, 423
U.S. 362, 377-80 (1976); see also Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, 730 F.2d 1139, 1143-44
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834 (1984). For scholarly criticism, see H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 87-107 (1973); Whitman, supra note 131, at 6-10 & 6 n.10;
Developments, supra note 36, at 1172-75. But see Eisenberg & Schwab, The Reality of Constitu-
tional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 644-52 (1987).
155. See Blackmun, supra note 14, at 23.
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In any event, the critics' fears are exaggerated. Section 1983 supremacy
clause actions will add only slightly to the federal courts' caseload, since
most supremacy clause plaintiffs file suit in federal court to begin with.
Only state court plaintiffs who now hope a state will waive its immunity
would turn instead to a federal forum. To the extent, therefore, that
supremacy clause rights deserve protection, section 1983 guarantees that
federal courts be available precisely when state courts would be
inadequate.
Courts might also dismiss section 1983 supremacy clause actions on the
policy grounds that granting damages spells fiscal disaster for municipal
defendants. 56 Governments forced to reimburse lost revenue could risk
high awards. Better, courts might propose, to reduce a plaintiff's damages
to arbitrary limits; 5 ' best, courts have implied, to reject the claims en-
tirely. The same logic applies to section 1988 attorney's fees: Instead of
dooming the American Rule, dismiss the cause of action.
In Maine v. Thiboutot, however, the Supreme Court encountered, and
rejected, similar arguments. 5 Section 1983 is now the "primary
means" 159 of transformative constitutionalism. That section 1983 works as
planned should hardly count against it.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since Reconstruction, section 1983 has become an indispensable part of
the constitutional process.' Some courts, though, are reluctant to imple-
ment the Forty-second Congress's whole vision. This Note has offered a
definition of section 1983's core terms that would give the statute its full
effect-ensuring thereby that people like the White Mountain Apaches
receive the succor section 1983 was meant to provide.
156. Cf Collins, supra note 12 (bemoaning "sheer scale of interim damages to regulated
business").
157. Cf id. ("it might be possible to give section 1983 an all-inclusive constitutional scope, but to
give district judges the discretion to deny damages when . . . the injunctive remedy was adequate").
158. In his dissent, Justice Powell wrote that giving force to the words "all laws" would "harass
state and local officials"; "creat[e] a major new intrusion into state sovereignty under our federal
system"; and establish, in effect, the regular shifting of fees. 448 U.S. 1, 22-23, 33 (1980) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
159. Blackmun, supra note 14, at 3.
160. Had Congress not enacted section 1983, the Supreme Court might eventually have crafted an
equivalent. Cf Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
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